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Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of national optimal tariﬀs for trans-
portation of natural gas in a setting where national gas production in its entirety
is exported to end-user markets abroad. In a situation where the transportation
network is owned altogether by a vertically integrated national gas producer, it is
shown that the optimal tariﬀ depends on the ownership structure in the integrated
transportation company as well as in the non-facility based gas company. There are
two reasons why it is possibly optimal with a mark-up on marginal transportation
costs. First, there is a premium on public revenue if domestic taxation is distorting.
Second, with incomplete national taxation of rents from the gas sector, the trans-
portation tariﬀs can serve as a second best way of appropriating rents accruing to
foreigners. In a situation where the network is run as a separate entity subject to
a rate of return regulation, it will be optimal to discriminate the tariﬀs between
shippers for the usual Ramseyean reasons.
1 Introduction
Norway is a major producer of natural gas in the European gas market. A minis-
cule part of the production is used domestically and mainly for industrial purposes.
Hence, the national interests in the gas sector are almost completely aligned with
export interests. The selling of natural gas in the downstream market used to be
separated from the upstream production. A centralized body representing all gas
producers on the Norwegian shelf in the North Sea conducted the bargaining with
respect to new sales contracts before decisions had been made as to what gas fields
were to supply the gas. The sold volumes were then allocated to productions fields
according to production eﬃciency criteria after the sales contracts had been con-
cluded. This way of organizing the gas sector was conducive to maximum bargaining
power in the downstream market and overall cost eﬃciency in the upstream produc-
tion. The customers were typically large distribution companies so that the gas was
sold on a wholesale basis.
This model was ruled out by EU’s Gas Market Directive which was adopted
in Norwegian legislation as of January 1, 2002. The purpose of the directive is to
open the common gas market for competition through laying down common rules
for transmission, supply and storage of natural gas. An important part of the di-
rective deals with measures aiming at securing third parties without transportation
facilities access to the existing transmission network on non-discriminatory terms.
The transportation facilities had earlier been reserved solely for the network own-
ers. However, according to the directive large customers and gas producers without
their own pipelines are to be considered legible to access the gas transmission net-
work on equal footing with the facility owners on conditions that do not distort
the competition in the downstream market. A neutral treatment of access to the
network for third parties is facilitated by separating selling and transportation roles.
Consequently, the network has been reorganized as a joint venture and an indepen-
dent system operator has been established and has the assignment of transportation
rights as one of its main tasks.
As a natural resource in limited supply there is an economic rent associated with
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the extraction of gas. Until the adoption of the Gas Market Directive the Norwegian
policy had been that this rent should be harvested on the production fields and not
in the transportation network. When the network was owned by the developers of
the gas field, this issue was not very important as the transportation costs were
considered an integral part of the total investment and operating costs of the gas
fields in question. With the separation between transportation and selling of gas the
problem of optimal tariﬀs has become an important issue; in particular with respect
to the pricing policy towards third parties.
Clearly, if the economic rents from gas extraction were fully appropriable in the
producing country, it would be first best optimal to price the use of the transporta-
tion facilities at marginal cost. That would maximize the contribution from the
gas sector to the domestic value added. However, for various reasons the domestic
appropriation of the economic rents is incomplete. An important shortcoming in
this respect is that economic rents are rarely taxed fully in the producing country
in so far as there is foreign ownership in domestic gas production. Moreover, multi-
nationals can channel part of the rents out of the domestic tax jurisdiction through
transfer pricing and internal financial transactions. Also, foreign customers with a
strong bargaining position may get hold of some of the rents trough exerting monop-
sony power which has become more likely in the new regime with gas companies
selling their gas independently of each other. Hence, the present paper is based on
the explicit assumption that the producer country cannot capture fully the resource
rent from gas production, and the main issue is whether the tariﬀ rates for gas trans-
port can serve as an imperfect substitute for a theoretically perfect but not fully
implementable national tax on economic rents. We also assume that the domestic
taxation is generally distorting so that there is a premium on public revenue.
The transportation facilities can be seen as inputs in the production and distri-
bution of gas and a mark up on marginal transportation costs will then be in the
nature of an indirect tax on this particular input. An important result in the theory
of taxation says that in a fully optimal tax system it will not be optimal to have
distorting taxes on inputs in production.1 From the tax perspective the issue is then
1Diamond and Mirrless (1971)
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whether an input tax levied through the transportation tariﬀs can be an imperfect
substitute when the economic rents cannot be fully taxed through a lump sum tax
on pure profits.
There is an extensive related literature on optimal access pricing, see e.g., Laf-
font and Tirole (1994). Cremer and Laﬀont (2002) as well as Cremer, Gasmi and
Laﬀont (2003) discuss optimal access pricing in the natural gas pipeline sector. Cre-
mer, Gasmi and Laﬀont (2003) examine optimal tariﬀs in a competitive market,
while Cremer and Laﬀont (2002) discuss pricing of transport under perfect as well
as imperfect competition. Common to these papers is that the optimal policy is
considering both consumer and producer interests while the present paper is ex-
amining optimal tariﬀs from the perspective of net export values and tax payer
interests. In section 2 we set forth a simplified economic model for analyzing these
issues. Section 3 discusses optimal tariﬀs in the case where the transport facilities
are owned entirely by a national gas producer, possibly with some public ownership
share. Some special cases are considered such as independent end-user markets,
scarce capacity and competition between the network owner and third parties in
the end-user market. Section 4 examines the consequences for the optimal tariﬀs in
the case of separation between extraction and selling of gas on the one hand and
transportation on the other.
2 A simplified model for transportation of gas
We consider a context where the transportation infrastructure is owned by a verti-
cally integrated gas producer that serves the end-user market in a foreign country.
There is also a gas producer without any transportation infrastructure of its own,
and which depends on access to the established network in order to sell its gas. The
non-facility based producer will be referred to as the third party, denoted by the
subscript T , and the vertically integrated network firm is denoted N . The profit
levels of the two firms are ΠT and ΠN , respectively.
The third party is privately owned, possibly by foreigners. More specifically, a
share 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the profits of the third party accrues to private domestic owners
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and a share (1− α) to foreigners. The network firm is completely domestically
owned, but we assume that a share 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of the firm belongs to the government.
Public revenues from gas activities reduce the need to raise public revenues through
general taxation, and the marginal social cost of raising tax revenue is k ≥ 0. The
value of the surplus accruing to the home country is thus given by
W = αΠT + (1 + βk)ΠN . (1)
We do not explicitly consider national income taxation of the two gas companies
and their owners.
The gas sales of the network owner are denoted xN , with unit price p, and the
sales of the third party are xT ,with unit price q. It seems natural to assume that the
decision variables of both producers are gas volumes, while the prices are determined
in the downstream markets. They may, however, be competing in the downstream
market. In the general case the price-quantity relation facing each producer thus
depends on both volumes, i.e.; p = p(xN , xT ) and q = q(xT , xN).
The activity related costs in the gas sector consist of two parts. The first part, to
be denoted cai (xi), measures the costs of gas extraction and of accessing the trans-
portation pipeline. This term depends solely on the producer’s own volume. The
other part is the transportation cost, which may depend on the transported volumes
of both parties, and will be denoted cti(xi, xj), i, j = N,T . Total transportation
costs are thus equal to Ct ≡ ctN(xN , xT )+ ctT (xN , xT ). This means that the marginal
cost of transporting company i’s gas is MCti ≡ ∂Ct/∂xi = ∂cti/∂xi+∂ctj/∂xi, where
the term ∂ctj/∂xi may be interpreted as a cost externality. This externality may for
instance be due to the fact that it is necessary to activate compressors in order to
increase the pressure if too much gas is fed into the pipeline. That will increase the
marginal costs for transporting gas for both producers.
The price that company i has to pay for transporting one unit of its gas is τ i.
Company i thus pays a marginal transport price which is higher than marginal costs
if τ i > MCti , while it pays less than marginal costs if τ i < MC
t
i .
2 It should be noted
2A substantial part of the variable transportation costs is made up of loss of energy in the
pipeline which varies positively with the distance that depends on the location of the input and
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that firm N perceives τN as an immaterial transfer price unless it is forced to run
the network and the downstream subsidiary as independent units (see Section 4).
We presuppose that the profit functions are suﬃciently concave so that all
second-order conditions are satisfied in the subsequent analysis. In particular, we
assume that dcaj/dxj > 0, ∂c
t
j/∂xj > 0 and ∂
2ctj/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0. We will also consider
the special case where the network has an absolute capacity limit K¯, such that
MCti →∞ when xN + xT → K¯.
2.1 Fully integrated network
Downstream profit for producer N is equal to p(xN , xT )xN− τNxN − caN(xN), while
its network profit is [τNxN + τTxT ]− [ctN(xN , xT ) + ctT (xN , xT )] . The internal price
τN is irrelevant if the firm maximizes the sum of network income and downstream
profit. In this case we may therefore write its object function as
ΠN = p(xN , xT )xN −
£
caN(xN) + c
t
N(xN , xT )
¤
+ τTxT − ctT (xN , xT ), (2)
We further have
ΠT = q(xT , xN)xT − caT (xT )− τTxT , (3)
We consider a two-stage game where the government sets the tariﬀ rate at stage
1, and the two firms compete in quantities at stage 2. Letting CN(xN , xT ) ≡
caN(xN) + c
t
N(xN , xT ) we can solve for the last stage to find
∂ΠN
∂xN
= p+ xN
∂p
∂xN
− ∂CN
∂xN
− ∂c
t
T
∂xN
≡ 0 and
∂ΠT
∂xT
= q + xT
∂q
∂xT
− ∂c
a
T
∂xT
− τT ≡ 0.
At stage 1 we solve dW/dτT = (1 + βk)dΠN/dτT + αdΠT/dτT = 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating ΠN in (2) with respect to τT yields
dΠN
dτT
=
·
p+ xN
∂p
∂xN
− ∂CN
∂xN
− ∂c
t
T
∂xN
¸
dxN
dτT
+
µ
τT + xN
∂p
∂xT
− ∂CN
∂xT
− ∂c
t
T
∂xT
¶
dxT
dτT
+xT ,
terminal point of the gas shipment. The transportation element in the cost function may therefore
not be symmetric in the volumes of the two shipping parties, e.g., because their gas fields may
located diﬀerently related to the downstream market.
5
where we have used the fact that ∂CN/∂xT = ∂ctN/∂xT . At the profit maximizing
volume for the network owner the term in the squared brackets vanishes, so that we
have
dΠN
dτT
=
µ
τT + xN
∂p
∂xT
− ∂CN
∂xT
− ∂c
t
T
∂xT
¶
dxT
dτT
+ xT . (4)
Similarly, we have for the third party that
dΠT
dτT
= xT
∂q
∂xN
dxN
dτT
− xT . (5)
The necessary condition for an optimal transportation tariﬀ is
(1 + βk)
·µ
τT + xN
∂p
∂xT
− ∂c
t
N
∂xT
− ∂c
t
T
∂xT
¶
dxT
dτT
+ xT
¸
+α
µ
xT
∂q
∂xN
dxN
dτT
− xT
¶
= 0.
(6)
To get an intuitive feeling for what (6) tells us, we will consider some special cases.
2.1.1 Market independence
Assume first that the two downstream markets are independent, so that ∂p/∂xT =
∂q/∂xN = 0. For the moment we disregard capacity constraints. Defining εT =
−dxT
dτT
τT
xT
as the elasticity of demand for gas transport with respect to the tariﬀ rate,
we can rewrite equation (6) as
τT − (∂ctT/∂xT + ∂ctN/∂xT )
τT
=
1 + βk − α
1 + βk
1
εT
. (7)
Condition (7) is an ownership adjusted version of the inverse elasticity rule.
Assume that the third party is totally domestically owned (α = 1) and that the
government has no shares in the network company (β = 0). It is then immediately
seen that the optimal tariﬀ rate for transporting the third party’s gas equals the
marginal transportation costs, including the marginal cost externality for the net
owner’s own transport (ctN/∂xT ).
From (7) we also see that it is socially optimal for the government to set the
tariﬀ rate above total marginal transportation costs if the third party is partly
owned by foreigners or if the network company is partly owned by the government.
Indeed, for α = 0 monopoly pricing is socially optimal irrespective of whether the
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government has ownership shares in the network company (note that the interests
of the government and the network owner coincide if α = 0).
If the government has a positive ownership in the transportation network andk >
0, it is optimal to charge the third party a price in excess of the total marginal
cost also in the case that the company is entirely domestically owned. The reason
for this is that the social value of shifting one unit of profit from T to N is βk, or
βk/(1+βk) if measured in units of the social value ofN ’s profits. More generally, the
term (1 + βk − α) / (1 + βk) can be interpreted as the optimal downscaling factor
of the monopoly transport price. As the marginal cost of taxation goes to infinity
(k →∞) or α→ 0, the optimal downscaling factor approaches unity (implying that
monopoly pricing is socially optimal for the country).
2.1.2 Scarce capacity.
To the extent that scarce capacity is showing up as increasing marginal transporta-
tion costs this is taken care of in the optimal pricing rule (7). We therefore assume
that there is an absolute capacity limit given by K¯, and we maintain the assumption
that the downstream markets are independent, ∂p/∂xT = ∂q/∂xN = 0. Moreover,
the gas of both producers is assumed to be symmetric from a capacity point of view.
The problem is then to maximize (1) subject to the constraint that xN + xT ≤ K¯.
The first order conditions for the network owner’s own transport and pricing of
the third party’s transport are given by
p− [∂CN/∂xN + ∂ctT/∂xN + γ/(1 + βk)]
p
=
1
ηN
(8)
τT − [∂ctT/∂xT + ∂ctN/∂xT ] + γ/(1 + βk)
τT
=
1 + βk − α
1 + βk
1
εT
(9)
where ηN ≥ 0 is the price elasticity of the demand for gas in the downstream
market and γ ≥ 0 is the shadow price of capacity. From (8) and (9) we see that
scarce capacity has the same eﬀect on the relative mark-ups for the network owner
and the third party as a uniform increase in the marginal transportation costs for
both shippers’ use of transportation capacity. Hence, it does not make any diﬀerence
for the optimal tariﬀ whether the network capacity on the margin is enlarged by
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increasing the pressure through costly compressors or demand is decreased through
an increase in the mark-up factor. Since the network owner and the third party
compete for scarce capacity, their willingness to pay for capacity must in either case
match the scarcity value in addition to the variable cost.3 Intuitively, the imputed
shadow price should be increased until the capacity restriction is fulfilled. The
numerical value of the shadow price γ is therefore determined in optimum.
Solving for the optimal prices yields
p =
1
1− 1ηT
·
∂CN
∂xN
+
∂ctT
∂xN
+ γ(1 + βk)
¸
τT =
1
1− 1+βk−α
1+βk
1
εT
·
∂ctT
∂xT
+
∂ctN
∂xT
+ γ(1 + βk)
¸
Thus the rationing of scarce capacity is handled through an equal calculated
capacity cost increment for the two shippers. The calculated cost of using scarce
capacity increases with the government’s share in the network’s profit when the
social value of profits accruing to the government is larger than one. The eﬀect on
the optimal tariﬀ rate depends on the mark-up factor. Assuming that the demand
for transportation of both the network owner and the third party has the same
price elasticity in the relevant interval, the optimal mark-up factor will be largest
for the network owner when α > 0. The reason for this is that with national owner
interests in the third party, part of the eﬃciency costs due to scarce capacity is born
by domestic owners, which is in itself an argument for a lower tariﬀ rate. For the
network owner the shadow cost of scarce capacity is added to the cost base which
is subject to a monopolistic mark-up. In that sense its scarcity cost is born by the
foreign end-users. When the third party is owned by foreigners, it will be optimal to
charge a full monopoly mark-up also for the third party’s use of the network. With
equal elasticities the price eﬀect from scarce capacity will then be the same for both
users. This means that it will be optimal to exert fully the market power both as
to the foreign owners of the non-facility based third party as well as to the foreign
consumers of the network company.
3The shadow price is divided by (1 + βk) in order to have it denominated in the social value of
the network owner’s profit.
8
2.1.3 Competition between the network owner and the third party in
the end-user market for gas
We now assume that the network owner and the third party compete for consumers
in the end-user market. This means that the two markets are connected, so that gas
delivered by the producer without transportation facilities is a (possibly imperfect)
substitute for gas delivered by the integrated producer. In this case it follows from
(6) that the first order condition for the socially optimal tariﬀ can be written as
τT −
³
∂ctT
∂xT
+
∂ctN
∂xT
− xN ∂p∂xT −
α
1+βkxT
∂q
∂xN
dxN
dxT
´
τT
=
1 + βk − α
1 + βk
1
εT
(10)
The expression in the parenthesis on the left hand side of (10) is the total in-
cremental costs of transporting another unit of T ’s gas. In addition to the pure
transportation costs, which are captured by the two first terms in the bracket, we
must now correct for the price eﬀects of a marginal increase in xT . More specifically,
an increase in xT reduces the price that the network owner can charge in the end-
user market (∂p/∂xT < 0). This is a cost for the producer country, and is captured
by the third term. At the same time the network owner will reduce its output if xT
increases (dxN/dxT < 0), and the partial eﬀect of this is that q increases. The fourth
term therefore represents a gain for the producer country if domestic residents own
shares in firm T (α > 0). This eﬀect on private sector profits has to be divided by
(1 + βk) in order to make it comparable with costs incurred by the network owner.
To highlight the diﬀerence between the tariﬀ rate preferred by the government
and the network owner, assume that α = 1 and β = 0. The welfare maximizing
tariﬀ rate then simplifies to
τT =
µ
∂ctT
∂xT
+
∂ctN
∂xT
¶
− xN
∂p
∂xT
− xT
∂q
∂xN
dxN
dxT
, (11)
while the profit maximizing tariﬀ rate for the network owner is4
τT =
µ
εT
εT − 1
¶·µ
∂ctT
∂xT
+
∂ctN
∂xT
¶
− xN
∂p
∂xT
¸
. (12)
The terms in the square bracket of (12) show that the network owner would charge
a mark-up on the sum of marginal transportation costs and the lost profit in the
4Technically, this is found by setting α = 0.
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downstream market due to a marginal increase in xT . The size of the mark-up
depends on the elasticity εT ; the higher the elasticity, the lower the mark-up (with
no mark-up in the limit case ε → ∞). Equation (11), on the other hand, shows
that the optimal tariﬀ is independent of the elasticity. Indeed, this equation may
be seen as a version of the eﬃcient component pricing rule.5 According to this rule
the socially optimal price for giving access to a network should include the marginal
cost for giving access plus the lost profit in the downstream market due to increased
competition. This latter eﬀect is represented by the second term. The last term
reflects the positive indirect eﬀect on the profits of the third party due to the fact
that crowding out some of the network owner’s sales increases the price for the third
party’s gas. This positive externality will not be taken into account by the network
owner. Hence, also for this reason the profit maximizing tariﬀ will be too high.
The diﬀerence between the monopoly tariﬀ and the socially optimal tariﬀ is
particularly large in the special case where α = 1 and β = 0, since the elasticity in
that case is irrelevant for the socially optimal price. However, if β > 0 (and k > 0)
the regulator finds it optimal that N has a relatively high profit, since that reduces
the need for taxation elsewhere in the economy. Thereby it will be socially optimal to
exert some monopoly power in order to indirectly tax private sector profits through
the transportation tariﬀ, and more so the higher the foreign ownership share in firm
T .
The extent to which the monopoly power should be exercised by the government
depends on the elasticity εT . In any case, the monopoly tariﬀ will always be higher
than the socially optimal one. For example, with εT = 2 and β = k = 0.5, we can
use equation (10) to find that the optimal monopoly mark-up factor will be 100 %
on marginal costs whereas the socially optimal mark-up is 11 %. 6
5This rule was first proposed by Robert Willig (1979).
6Moreover, it should be noted that the social marginal costs are lower than the private marginal
costs of the network owner, since the former includes the term −xT ∂q∂xN
dxN
dxT
< 0.
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2.2 Separation of ownership between transportation net-
work and extraction and marketing activities
The oﬀshore network for transportation of natural gas is a prime example of a
natural monopoly. In the North Sea more than 90 % of the costs are fixed and sunk
for the infrastructure. This renders the transportation network an essential facility
which it is neither commercially nor socially worth-while to duplicate, everything
else equal. Thus, the network owner has some market power over third parties that
need access to the transportation network. The fact that the integrated gas producer
has a monopoly on the transportation facility and competes with non-facility based
producers in the end-user markets may be unfortunate from a competitive point of
view. Clearly, competitive neutrality is best served by unbundling the transportation
network from upstream production and downstream market activities. Generally,
separation of networks from production and market activities has also been a policy
stance taken by the European Union to the eﬀect that networks within railways,
telecom and gas should be organized in such a way that the services of the natural
network monopoly do not interfere with the competitive services depending on access
to these networks. The conditions for access to the network services should then be
regulated as they are supposed to be natural monopolies.
We assume that the transportation company is subject to a cost-plus regulation.
This means that total revenue should cover variable and fixed costs including a
regulated return on the investments, but no profits in excess of that. Thus cost
recovery requirement will be a budget constraint. We consider two varieties of this
regulation. One is where the regulatory agency is free to diﬀerentiate the tariﬀ rate
for the two gas companies, and the other one where the two companies are to be
faced with equal tariﬀ rates.
2.2.1 Diﬀerentiated tariﬀ rates
We let F denote total fixed costs in the transportation network including the regu-
lated returns to invested capital. Then the budget constraint takes the form£
τNxN − ctN(xN , xT )
¤
+
£
τTxT − ctT (xT , xN)
¤
− F = 0, (13)
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and the profit levels of the companies are
ΠN = p(xN , xT )xN − caN(xN)− τNxN (14)
ΠT = q(xT , xN)xT − caT (xT )− τTxT
Socially optimal tariﬀs now maximize W = (1 + βk)ΠN + αΠT , subject to (13)
and (14). Letting ∂Ct/∂xj ≡ ∂ctj/∂xj + ∂cti/∂xj, i, j = N,T (i 6= j), denote total
marginal costs (inclusive of marginal external costs) of transporting gas for each
shipper, the first order condition for optimum tariﬀ rates can be written as
³
τN − ∂C
t
∂xN
´
+
³
τT − ∂C
t
∂xT
´
dxT
dxN
+
(1+βk)xN
∂p
∂xT
dxT
dxN
+αxT
∂q
∂xN
v
τN
=
v − (1 + βk)
v
1
εN
(15)
and³
τT − ∂C
t
∂xT
´
+
³
τN − ∂C
t
∂xN
´
dxN
dxT
+
(1+βk)xN
∂p
∂xT
+αxT
∂q
∂xN
dxN
dxT
v
τT
=
v − α
v
1
εT
, (16)
where v is the shadow price of the budget constraint. Thus v represents the marginal
social value of profits in the transportation company. Observing that v reflects the
reduction in total national surplus W from an increase in fixed costs by one unit,
we must have that v > 1 as marginal cost pricing will not cover fixed costs if
the transportation network is a natural monopoly. Thus, they must be covered
in a distorting way. If marginal cost pricing in the transportation company were
financially viable, v = 1.
The first two terms in the numerator of (15) and (16) reflect the marginal contri-
bution to fixed costs in the network unit from a marginal increase in the transporta-
tion of gas for N and T , respectively. The third term in (15) is the indirect eﬀects on
profits accruing to national owners due to the cross-price eﬀect in the two end-user
markets from a marginal increase in the transportation of gas for company N . The
eﬀect on N ’s profits is adjusted for the marginal welfare eﬀects from reduced public
revenue due to public ownership, while the eﬀect on T ’s profits is adjusted for the
national ownership share. These eﬀects on national profits have to be divided by the
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shadow price v in order to make it commensurable with the social value of profits
in the transportation company.
We can interpret the last two terms in the numerator on the left hand side of (15)
and (16) as the marginal social costs due to the price eﬀects assessed at the national
level of shipping an additional unit of gas for company N and T , respectively. The
optimal social mark-ups on these marginal social costs are 1
1− v−(1+βk)
v
1
εN
and 1
1− v−α
v
1
εT
for the two tariﬀs, respectively. Clearly, if the two companies have solely private
and national owners, i.e., α = 1, β = 0, then pricing according to marginal social
costs is socially optimal if v = 1 and the transportation capacity is not scarce.
On the other hand, if T is owned solely by foreigners, then monopoly pricing of
transportation allocated to that company would be optimal regardless of whether
the profit constraint is binding or not. In the present model the monopoly profit
in the transportation company will accrue to the owners of the domestically owned
company through reduced tariﬀs.7
One may think of the profit margin in relation to marginal social costs implicit
in the transportation tariﬀs as an indirect tax on the use of transport capacity in
order to finance fixed costs for the infrastructure. With equal price elasticities in
the demand for transport and a positive public ownership in the gas company N ,
the optimal indirect tax rate (as a percentage of the tariﬀ rate) will be larger for
company T with solely private owners if there is an extra premium k > 0 on public
revenue. The reason for this is that the indirect tax on N reduces the producer
surplus and hence the profits accruing to the government. Thus, part of the excess
burden from this indirect tax is born by the tax payers. In this respect one gets a sort
of double taxation; partly because of the eﬃciency loss due to reduced profits and
partly because it leads to increased distorting taxation in the rest of the economy.
With foreign ownership in T part of the excess burden of financing the fixed costs
through a tariﬀ on that firm is born by foreigners. This strengthens the arguments
for tariﬀ discrimination in favour of N .
7One might imagine that this could lead to τN < ∂c
t
N/∂xN + ∂c
t
T/∂xN , which may violate
regulation against cross subsidies.
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We consider a numerical example:
Assume that εN = εT = 1.5 and cross elasticities are zero, v = 2, k = 0.5, β =
0.5, and α = 1, so that both companies have only national owners. Optimal mark-
ups will in this case be 1.33 and 1.5 for N and T , respectively. With α = 0, the
optimal mark-up on T increases to 3, which is a 200% increase of the marginal
transportation costs.
2.2.2 Equal tariﬀ rates
We now assume that the regulatory agency is imposing a requirement of equal treat-
ment as to the conditions for access to the transportation network irrespective of the
shipper’s ownership structure. Equal treatment is here assumed to require equal tar-
iﬀ rates related both to private versus public and domestic versus foreign ownership
of the shipping companies. We retain the assumption that the transportation com-
pany is subject to a rate of return regulation, which in the static case is equivalent
with a budget constraint.
Observing that all terms with ∂p/∂xN and ∂q/∂xT vanish by the envelope prop-
erty of profit maxima, the first order condition for an optimal tariﬀ rate can now be
written as
τ − ∂Ct∂xN +
αxT ∂q/∂xN
v
τ
dxN
dτ
+
τ − ∂Ct∂xT +
(1+βk)xN∂p/∂xT
v
τ
dxT
dτ
(17)
=
µ
v − (1 + βk)
v
1
εN
¶
dxN
dτ
+
µ
v − α
v
1
εT
¶
dxT
dτ
.
The left hand side of condition (17) is a weighted average of the relative marginal
social profit margins in the two companies, with the marginal capacity demand
reactions with respect to changes in the tariﬀ rate as weights, while the right hand
side is a weighted sum of the inverse of the direct price elasticities.
One would expect the optimal common tariﬀ to be in between the optimally
diﬀerentiated tariﬀs. In order to examine this presumption we make the simplifying
assumption that the marginal transportation costs are the same for the two shippers,
and that cross price eﬀects between the two gas markets are zero. Letting dX/dτ =
dxN/dτ + dxT/dτ denote total reduction in demand for transport induced by a
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marginal increase in the tariﬀ rate, and letting MCt denote the common marginal
transportation cost, condition (17) simplifies to
τ −MC 0
τ
=
µ
v − (1 + βk)
v
1
εN
¶
dxN/dτ
dX/dτ
+
µ
v − α
v
1
εT
¶
dxT/dτ
dX/dτ
(18)
If the price elasticities of demand are not too diﬀerent from what they were in
the case with optimal tariﬀ discrimination, we see that the optimum profit margin
relative to tariﬀ rate in the transportation company is a weighted average of the
corresponding margin rates in the case with rate discrimination. With a common
tariﬀ rate it will be less attractive to tax the foreign owners in company T through
the tariﬀ rate as parts of the eﬃciency costs are imposed on the domestically owned
company with public ownership. In that sense part of the excess burden from taxing
foreign owners through the tariﬀ is born by domestic tax payers.
We consider a numerical example.
We return to the former example and assume that company N accounts for a
share δ of the total response in the demand for transportation capacity to a marginal
increase in the tariﬀ rate, and company T for (1− δ). As before, we assume that
εN = εT = 1.5, v = 2, k = 0.5, β = 0.5, and α is 1 or 0. Solving (18) with respect
to τ yields τ = MC
t
0.67+0.08δ for α = 1 and τ =
MCt
0.33+0.42δ for α = 0. In both cases the
optimal common tariﬀ rate will be in between the optimum company-specific tariﬀ
rates in the case with third degree price discrimination, and the size of this common
monopoly mark-up depends on N ’s share in the total demand response. The larger
N ’s response, the smaller the optimal mark-up on marginal transportation costs.
With α = 1 the optimal mark-up is 1.33 for δ = 1 and 1.5 for δ = 0, which are the
optimum tariﬀ rates with tariﬀ discrimination.
3 Conclusion and Discussion
In the present paper we have discussed optimal tariﬀs from a national perspective
for transportation of natural gas for gas shippers without own transport facilities in
a setting where the national gas production in its entirety is exported to end-user
markets abroad. An underlying assumption for the analysis is that the national
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appropriation of the resource rent through national taxation is incomplete and the
issue is to what extent it would be optimal to harvest some of the rents through the
tariﬀ rates for gas transport. In the situation where the transportation network is
owned by an integrated national gas producer, it is shown that the optimal tariﬀ
depends on the ownership structure in the integrated transportation company as
well as in the non-facility based gas company. More precisely, there are two features
of ownership that are decisive for the optimal tariﬀ. One is the public ownership
share in the integrated transport company which in the case of a premium on public
revenue calls for a tariﬀ in excess of the marginal transportation costs. This is due
to the fact that a unit of profit has a higher social value in the network company
than in the privately owned company. The other is the foreign ownership share
in the privately owned company that depends on access to the network for its gas
transport. A mark up on transportation cost is in that case an indirect way of
appropriating rents accruing to foreigners. Indeed, the optimal tariﬀ approaches the
monopoly tariﬀ as the foreign ownership share approaches 100%.
An integrated national gas producer controlling the transportation network and
exerting monopoly power in the pricing of third party access is certainly not in ac-
cordance with EU’s gas market directive laying down conditions conducive to a more
competitive gas market. One step in that direction is to debundle the transportation
activity from the producing and selling activities. Accordingly, we have examined
optimal tariﬀs in a scenario were the network is run as a separate entity subject to
a rate of return regulation. Again, for the above mentioned reasons it is optimal to
discriminate the optimal tariﬀ between the fully domestically owned shipper with a
public share and a fully privately owned shipper with possibly some foreign owner
interests. In that case the optimal tariﬀs may be seen as Ramsey prices and the
mark-ups as indirect taxes that are used to finance fixed costs for maintaining and
operating the network (inclusive of regulated profits). If non-discriminatory terms
for the access of third parties to the network are to be interpreted as equal tariﬀs for
all shippers, the optimal tariﬀs will be in between the optimally diﬀerentiated tariﬀs.
This regulation of course will mean a welfare loss to the gas exporting country as a
larger part of the excess burden has to be born by nationals in the capacity of tax
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payers as well as recipients of profits from the gas sector.
The above analysis is partial in that it has been conducted from the point of
view of producer interests. Consumer interests have been taken into account only
indirectly through their role as tax payers. In a setting where the gas is also con-
sumed domestically, consumer interests have to be taken into account more directly.
However, it is well known that the diﬀerence between Ramsey prices and monopoly
prices is primarily with respect to the price level while relative prices are the same.
Thus, including consumer interests is not likely to change the structure of the opti-
mal tariﬀs derived in the various scenarios. The model is partial in other respects
as well. Most notably, we have considered the transportation system as a separate
activity rather than as an integral part of the total value chain. In the long run
transportation tariﬀs might aﬀect both optimum depletion policies and gas mar-
ket strategies. We have also abstracted from uncertainty both related to upstream
activities and downstream demand.
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